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 Reflections on the ‘Devolution Paradox’: a comparative examination of 
multi-level citizenship 
Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffery, Daniel Wincott, Richard Wyn Jones 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses a paradox in the literature on federal and decentralised states: citizens 
want their regional governments to do more and yet seem reluctant to embrace the logical 
consequences of regional control, namely inter-regional policy variation and limited state-
wide intervention in policy provision.  Based on a survey conducted in fourteen regions 
across Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom we clarify the extent of this 
devolution paradox and identify variables that seem to mitigate or exacerbate its presence, 
including strength of regional identity, regional institutional authority and regional economic 
wealth.  The analysis helps us to understand where and how multi-level citizenship operates.  
 
Keywords: citizenship, public policy, devolution, regions, federalism 
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In recent years a number of authors have pointed to a paradox: citizens in federal and 
regionalised states typically want their regional institutions of government to do more than 
they do now, and central government institutions less;i yet at the same time they appear 
reluctant to embrace what would appear to be logical consequences, namely more inter-
regional variation, and less intervention to secure state-wide equity, in public policy provision. 
Though aspects of this paradox have been identified in Germany (e.g. GRUBE 2001) and 
Canada (c.f. JEFFERY 2006), it has received particular attention in the post-devolution 
United Kingdom, where powerful popular support for further-reaching devolution in Scotland 
and Wales appears to co-exist with continuing preferences for state-wide uniformity of policy 
(CURTICE, 2006: 102-9; JEFFERY, 2005; WYN JONES and SCULLY, 2009).  What we 
call the ‘devolution paradox’ is intriguing, not only because of its potential political 
implications in an era characterised by ‘the rise of regional authority’ (HOOGHE, et al. 2010), 
but also – and centrally for our current purposes – for the profound analytical questions it 
raises about public attitudes towards, and expectations of, governmental institutions in 
systems of multi-layered authority. In this paper we will seek to specify some of those 
questions more fully as well as provide some necessarily tentative answers.  
 
Several potential explanations for the devolution paradox may be identified in the 
literature. Reflecting on the UK, James Mitchell (2006: 165-6) has argued that the pressures 
which led to devolution in Scotland and Wales had little to do with the advocacy of distinctive 
policy agendas per se, but are rather better understood in terms of reclaiming ownership of the 
political process after a period under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
when the UK government appeared indifferent or even hostile to Scottish and Welsh concerns. 
On this view, devolution was above all a process of democratic renewal of which a distinctive 
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policy agenda was a by-product. A related view that has been rehearsed both in work on the 
UK (JEFFERY 2009) and in wider comparative analysis (e.g. BANTING 2006), is that 
federal and devolved states embody distinctive logics: a logic of proximity and 
responsiveness of decision-making at a regional scale within the state; and a logic of equity 
and solidarity that is effected on a state-wide scale through uniform policies and services. 
While these logics may appear to stand in tension with one another, citizens may well endorse 
both as desirable, producing the seemingly paradoxical responses that public attitudes surveys 
reveal.  
 
Whether or not citizens do endorse both logics, and how they reconcile any cross-
pressures they feel in simultaneously pursuing collective goals at regional and state-wide 
scales, is, however, an open question. It remains open because, with too few exceptions, 
public attitudes have mostly been explored by political scientists at state-wide scales (and, 
increasingly, through aggregation of state-wide samples at trans-state scales). Only in some 
places, but then often rather patchily, have public attitudes on political participation and 
public policy been explored at regional scales. The data that inform this paper are an initial 
attempt to build a more systematic evidence base on how citizens negotiate – paradoxically or 
not – multi-level government within the state. These data were generated by the ‘Citizenship 
after the Nation-State’ (CANS) project which fielded a common survey questionnaire to 
randomly selected samples of at least 900 respondents in 14 regions in five European states in 
early 2009. The survey was designed to elicit views on how public authority should best be 
organised at regional and state-wide scales, and of how that authority should be used to make 
or influence public policies.ii  
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The CANS project has two inter-linked theoretical points of departure (as developed 
more fully in JEFFERY and WINCOTT 2010 and JEFFERY 2012). The first is in T.H. 
Marshall’s ([1950] 1992) understanding of ‘citizenship’ as the product of the interaction over 
centuries of different clusters of civil, political and social rights and their eventual bundling at 
the scale of the ‘nation-state’ after the Second World War.iii The second is the identification 
of ‘methodological nationalism’, the unreflective use of the state as a unit of analysis (see e.g. 
MARTINS 1974; CHERNILO 2007), as a problem not just for the understanding of social 
and political phenomena at trans-state scales (a problem now widely recognised e.g. by 
BECK 2007; SCHOLTE 2005), but also at regional scales within the state. Focusing attention 
on the state-wide scale – as some of the key branches of political science have long done – 
runs the danger of leaving politics at other scales ‘hidden from view’ (WIMMER and 
GLICK-SCHILLER 2002: 302). One of those key branches – welfare state analysis – has, of 
course, been enduringly shaped by Marshall’s work, in particular the notion that citizenship 
was somehow ‘completed’ by the addition of social rights to earlier civil and political rights 
with the establishment of the national welfare state. That association of social rights with the 
‘nation-state’ has had a powerful normative legacy, shaping many of the key contributions to 
the analysis of the welfare state over the last decades, and underpinning widespread 
assumptions that the state-wide scale is a ‘natural’ one for the pursuit of social welfare 
(JEFFERY and WINCOTT 2010: 182-6; cf. BANTING 2006; JEFFERY 2002).  
 
Yet in Marshall’s work there is an inherent challenge to any notion of ‘completion’ of 
citizenship or of any ‘natural’ scale for realising it (WINCOTT 2009). For Marshall 
citizenship was dynamic, with change in any one of its component clusters spilling over to 
produce change in others. One of the most significant changes to the nationalised pattern of 
citizenship Marshall wrote about after the Second World War has been the decentralisation of 
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political rights to regional scales. Since around 1970 there has been a trend towards the 
establishment of new elected institutions of regional government (HOOGHE, MARKS and 
SCHAKEL 2010) and the growth or emergence of new forms of regional political 
mobilisation focused on those institutions (JEFFERY 2010b). There has also been a 
significant widening of the policy responsibilities carried out by those institutions (HOOGHE, 
MARKS and SCHAKEL 2010). The growing importance of regions prompts the question at 
the heart of the apparent devolution paradox. The rescaling of political rights to regional 
democratic institutions and the political mobilisation that has accompanied that rescaling may 
– in Marshall’s terms – spill over into a rescaling of social rights to the regional scale, as 
different regional jurisdictions develop differing packages of public policies (e.g. MORENO 
and McEWEN 2005; HARRISON 2006; LODGE and SCHMUECKER 2010). So, if citizens 
approve of the decentralisation of government, do they also approve of the inter-regional 
diversification of public policy that can and often does result? And if not, why not? 
 
Before exploring our findings, a number of caveats should be entered. First the survey 
is a snapshot of 14 regions in five states; although these were selected to provide variation on 
a number of variables, this is evidently a small set of regions from a small set of states. What 
it can tell us about the ‘multi-level citizen’ is necessarily limited. Second it is a snapshot taken 
in 2009. It can say little about change over time, except where the questions it asked connect 
with earlier surveys to establish two or more time points for comparison. Third, although our 
project title may perhaps appear a little polemical – Citizenship after the Nation-State – we do 
not in fact seek to claim that the ‘nation-state’ has become redundant or rendered insignificant 
as regional-scale politics become more important. We are clear that the state-wide scale 
remains the primary focus of most citizens, political parties and interest groups in most areas 
of political contestation in most advanced democracies. Our focus, by contrast, is on the 
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transformative effect on the (nation-)state of the growth of public authority, political 
mobilisation and policy variation at the regional scale. The growing importance of regional 
scale politics suggests that the state has to some extent become ‘de-nationalised’, and recast 
as a more complex multi-levelled form of political organisation that needs to respond to the 
demands of distinctive regional political communities as well as the political community as 
organised at the state-wide scale.  
 
Mapping the Devolution Paradox 
Table 1 about here 
In essence, the CANS project is an exploration of how citizens negotiate multi-levelled 
statehood. As Table 1 demonstrates, its 14 regional cases were selected to provide variation 
on three independent variables that we felt could influence the extent to which citizens might 
pursue collective goals at regional as well as (or instead of) at statewide scales: strength of 
regional identity; scope of regional institutional authority; and strength of the regional 
economy.iv The cases range from: 
1) Historic regions (or, perhaps better, stateless nations) like Wales and Catalonia to 
regions initially created as administrative conveniences like Lower Saxony and Ile de 
France; 
2) High autonomy (‘self rule’) regions like those in Spain and Scotland, through ‘shared 
rule’ regions interlocked with central government like those in Germany and Austria, 
to weaker administrative regions in France; and  
3) Economically powerful regions like Bavaria or Ile de France to economically weak 
regions like Thuringia and Galicia.  
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If we were to identify a devolution paradox among citizens in these regions, we would 
expect to find evidence of strong preference for (more) regional government alongside a 
preference for uniform, statewide policy outcomes. We would also expect this paradox to be 
less evident in historic, institutionally powerful and economically strong regions, which are 
likely to benefit from and be more relaxed about intra-state variation. We might expect the 
strongest evidence of the paradox to be found in ‘intermediate’ regions.  Consistently ‘statist’ 
attitudes might be expected in the most feeble of regions – those that are institutionally or 
economically weak and lack historic foundations – although if the preference for (more) 
regional government turns out to be widely spread even in ‘weak’ regions, then these could 
turn out to be among the most paradoxical. We explore these expectations below first through 
a discussion of aggregate level region-by-region findings and second at the individual level 
across the dataset as a whole. We then drill down into the data by means of further inter-
regional comparison.  
 
Support for More Regional Government … 
Table 2 about here 
Before we analyse how much power citizens believe government should have it is useful to 
establish what individuals think of the various institutional levels affecting their lives.  Table 
2 reports the relative importance respondents give to the decisions of regional and state-level 
institutions. Citizens attribute importance to both regional and state-level decisions, with 
more respondents treating the state level as very important in all but two cases, Scotland and 
Catalonia. There is relatively little cross-regional variation around the importance attributed to 
state-level decisions, with responses tending to cluster in the 40-50 per cent range. The state-
level is clearly important to citizens. The importance attached to decisions of regional 
institutions is significantly more variable and accounts for most of the variation in the relative 
 8 
importance scores in column c. Table 2 establishes from the outset the enduring importance 
for citizens of statewide political institutions and that the importance of regional institutions 
varies from place to place.  It also suggests that making a clear distinction between ‘weak’ 
and ‘intermediate’ regions in terms of patterns of support for regional government is difficult. 
Table 3 about here 
The question whether the state level should be as important, or whether the regional 
level should be more important is addressed in Table 3, which reports responses to questions 
about which level of government should and does ‘have most influence over the way’ each 
region ‘is run’. It has been ordered according to responses on whether the state level ‘does 
have most influence’. Oddly, given the relative importance attributed to state and regional 
level decisions in Table 2, there is nowhere a majority of respondents that thinks the state 
level ‘does have most influence’ and everywhere except Scotland and Wales a majority that 
thinks the regional level does have most influence. Evaluations of the institutions that ‘have 
most influence’ do not vary much within states, suggesting a fairly uniform perception within 
states of the distribution of ‘influence’ across levels of government. What is also striking is 
how across all regions – with the single exception of Castilla-La Mancha – more respondents 
indicate that regions should have more power than say this level already has the most power, 
which might suggest support for an increase in regional level powers.  That distinction is at its 
widest in Scotland and Wales, perhaps reflecting the continuing and very active debate in 
both places about the extension of devolved powers, or even the particular dynamics of what 
Rawlings has termed ‘national devolution’ within the context of the UK state (2003). But the 
view that regional institutions should have most influence is everywhere a majority view, and 
one held by supermajorities of three-quarters or more respondents in all but three regions 
(Castilla-La Mancha, Ile de France and Galicia).  Again, the overall pattern here suggests a 
difficulty in distinguishing between intermediate and weak regions. 
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Tale 4 about here 
The sense that regional government should do more rather than less than it does now 
is confirmed in Table 4 which reports responses on a set of constitutional options ranged 
either side of the status quo situation in the various regions. Obviously the status quo position 
differs from place to place, which means that respondents almost certainly have different 
things in mind when envisaging ‘more’ or ‘fewer’ powers than now. What is significant, 
though, is that everywhere the more powers option easily outweighs the fewer powers option 
and is in eight out of 14 cases the most popular option. In some cases – Catalonia, Scotland, 
Bavaria and Wales – a significant group also favours a more radical version of ‘more powers’: 
independence (the table is ordered by adding responses in the columns ‘more powers’ and 
‘independence’). The combined message from Tables 2-4 is that whatever kind of region they 
live in – whether or not historic, institutionally entrenched or wealthy – citizens across all our 
regions appear to want their regional institutions to do more rather than less. 
 
… But Not Inter-Regional Policy Variation? 
The preference at an abstract level for more regional control is not, however, generally 
reproduced when our respondents were asked more concrete questions about policy.  These 
include: which level of government was ‘most suitable’ for ‘dealing with’ particular policy 
fields or challenges (Table 5); whether particular issues should be dealt with uniformly across 
the state or a matter for each region to decide for itself (Table 6); and whether ‘money should 
be transferred from the richer parts’ of the state ‘to the poorer parts so that everyone can have 
similar levels of public services’ (Table 7). 
Table 5 about here 
Table 5, which also allows the EU as an option as the ‘most suitable’ level, reveals a 
clear overall pattern, if with some important exceptions. It reports on 70 cases: 14 regions and 
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five policy fields in each. In only 14/70 cases (cells highlighted in grey) does a plurality of 
respondents identify the region as the most suitable level for the making of policy.  In 6 of 
these cases – related to education and health in Scotland, Wales and Catalonia - a majority 
judged the regional level most suitable. In 9/70 cases (all in environmental policy) the EU was 
identified as most suitable, and in the other 47 cases the plurality (and in 42 cases a majority) 
deemed state-level government was most suitable. In no region was the regional level 
identified as the most suitable for dealing with unemployment and in only two – Scotland and 
Catalonia – for dealing with crime. In four regions there is a plurality preference for regional 
control of the environment, although the balance between region and state control of this 
policy field is affected by the relatively strong preferences for the EU as most suitable in 
environmental policy. Perhaps the most striking results are those for the two classic social 
policy fields of health and education. There, the same four regions – Catalonia, Scotland, 
Wales and Galicia – stand out as preferring regional-level action. In these regions, which 
possess well established nationalist movements and a self perception as a historic nation, 
citizens appear to be more consistent in their preferences, at least in respect of education and 
health policies, favouring both regional control in the abstract and regional control in specific 
policy areas. In all other regions the state is identified as most suitable for dealing with 
problems in health and education, generally by around two-thirds or more respondents.  
Table 6 about here 
This apparent preference for state-level and, by implication, uniform state-wide action 
is even more strongly underlined in Table 6. This makes more explicit a choice between 
statewide uniformity and regional-scale decision-making. The Table offers 56 cases (that is, 
14 regions across four policy issues) and for only three is there a preference for the region to 
decide, all in Catalonia.  Scotland, Wales and Galicia generally have the next highest 
preferences for regional decision, although they are some way behind Catalonia. Outside of 
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these four cases the lowest preference for uniformity on any of the policy issues is 70 per cent 
(Ile de France, old age care). The Austrian regions are most pro-uniformity, with close to 90 
per cent of respondents in each of them preferring uniform action rather than regional 
decision, with the French and German regions only a little behind.  
Table 7 about here 
Table 7 offers a different perspective on statewide uniformity. It reports responses to a 
question focused on what we term inter-regional solidarity: whether or not resources should 
be transferred from richer to poorer regions to ensure all citizens have similar public services. 
The table has been ordered by ranking the regions where respondents most disagreed with 
rich-poor transfers. Two aspects of the responses are particularly striking. The first is that a 
majority of respondents everywhere felt there should be state-level government action to even 
out economic disparities, and that richer regions should transfer resources to poorer regions 
(except in Salzburg, where this was narrowly the plurality view). As suggested also in Table 6, 
a sense of statewide equity clearly remains powerful.  
 
But second, those respondents that disagree most with the propositions in Table 7 are a 
different group than those – in the four stateless nations – more likely to favour regional-scale 
action in education, health and to an extent in other policy fields. Rather, the regions where 
there are higher levels of disagreement with inter-regional transfers are also among the 
economically stronger regions in our analysis. The middle and right-hand columns of the table 
report and rank regions that subjectively were felt (in the views of respondents), and 
objectively were (in terms of regional GDP), economically stronger than other regions in that 
state. The top six for each economic ranking are highlighted to ease comparison, with four 
appearing in the top six for opposition to transfers, subjective and objective wealth: Bavaria, 
Salzburg, Upper Austria and Vienna. Equally regions at the bottom of the objective and 
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subjective rankings are generally those that most strongly endorse interventions, possibly to 
compensate for their own regional economic weakness: Wales, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha 
and Brittany. There is a dividing line here which suggests that a general commitment to 
statewide equity may be under challenge by a lesser willingness of people in more affluent 
regions to cross-subsidise less well off regions.v 
 
This initial analysis has opened up a number of perspectives on the devolution paradox. 
Four, in particular, deserve to be highlighted: 
1. Some regions are less paradoxical than others. Specifically Catalonia, Scotland, Wales 
and Galicia are the four most consistent regions in matching preferences for more 
regional government with preferences for regional policy responsibility among those 
we analyse here. 
2. Regions in Austria, Germany and France appear paradoxical in wanting both more 
influence and powers for regional institutions, while also preferring state-level policy 
responsibilities and statewide uniformity of policy. 
3. Richer regions appear in the main least likely to support inter-regional transfers to 
support statewide equity in the delivery of public services; there is a suggestion here 
that the devolution paradox is qualified by relative regional economic strength. 
4. Yet on questions of statewide uniformity and inter-regional transfers majorities 
everywhere (with marginal exceptions in Catalonia) appear to have preferences for 
action by state-level governments and/or with state-wide reach. Even in the four less 
paradoxical regions and the richest regions there remains a powerful commitment to 
equity and solidarity at a statewide scale. 
Nonetheless, looking beyond these important variations and qualifications, at the aggregate 
level at least, our analysis suggests that claims that a devolution paradox exists are well 
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founded. Strong support for increased regional authority tends to coexist with strong support 
for uniform policy outcomes across the territory of the state. Moreover, and further 
highlighting the apparent contradictions, support for increased regional authority in the 
abstract tends not to be accompanied by support for regional authority in at least those policy 
areas featured in our survey.  
 
The existence at the aggregate level of a devolution paradox itself represents a suggestive 
research finding. We know that aggregate voting results, for example, show differential 
voting patterns in regional as opposed to state-wide elections, and in particular the tendency 
of regionalist parties to prosper in the former to a far greater extent than the latter (DE 
WINTER 1998, DE WINTER et al 2006, HOPKIN 2009, HOPKIN and BRADBURY 2006, 
HOUGH and JEFFERY 2006, MÜLLER-ROMMEL 1998, SWENDEN and MADDENS 
2008).  These findings may well become more intelligible when viewed through the prism of 
the devolution paradox. But as the example of election results – a nonpareil example of 
aggregated behaviour – reminds us, to focus on aggregate results alone is insufficient if we 
are to understand the individual-level attitudes and behaviours that give rise to overall 
outcomes. Similarly, to posit and even demonstrate the existence of a devolution paradox at 
the aggregate level tells us very little about attitudes at the individual level: it is to this task 
that we now turn. 
 
From aggregate to individual level 
Table 8 about here 
Here we compare individuals across the 14 regions through multivariate analysis. The models 
set out in Table 8 take as their dependent variables three individual components of the 
devolution paradox: attitudes to the suitability of regional institutions for dealing with policy 
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issue and problems (described in Table 5); preferences for policy uniformity (Table 6); and 
preferences for inter-regional transfers (Table 7). By understanding the types of individuals 
most likely to support regional control or policy uniformity we can perhaps help to account 
for the presence of the paradox.  Our analysis employs the level of attachment to the region, 
the importance attributed to the decisions of regional institutions and subjective perceptions of 
relative regional economic performance as independent variables. 
A mix of demographic and political control variables are deployed. The demographic control 
variables include age, gender, marital status, religiosity, and ethnic minority status. The 
political control variables include political interest, two measures of political efficacy and 
three assessments of current or desired regional influence. In the case of the latter these are: 
the belief that the region should have the most influence over regional affairs, support for 
independence and the  belief that the region is most ‘concerned with the needs and wishes of’ 
people in the region.  
In addition, we have included a binary control variable that indicates whether the respondent 
is an inhabitant of one of the ‘historic regions’, namely Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and 
Galicia, which our previous analysis has suggested are characterised by different patterns of 
attitudes.  
 
The results in Table 8 contain the unstandardised regression coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic regressions. Each of the three columns represents a 
different dependent variable. The results show that our independent and control variables 
account for around one fifth of the variation in our dependent variables on policy control and 
policy uniformity, but much less for the variable on inter-regional solidarity.  
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Reading across the analysis, four key findings emerge. First, the demographic 
variables, in general, do not account for significant variation in our dependent variables; no 
single demographic variable matters consistently across the dependent variables. Second, 
when we turn to the independent variables we see that regional attachment and the importance 
attributed to regional decisions are consistently significant for the policy variables and in the 
expected direction. A greater sense of regional attachment and greater perception of regional 
institutional importance is positively associated with regional policy suitability, and 
negatively associated with state-wide policy uniformity, even when we control for all other 
variables in the model. Perceived regional wealth is a significant and negative predictor of 
inter-regional solidarity and policy uniformity – those who feel that they live in a wealthier 
region are less likely to support state intervention and more likely to support regional policy 
variation – and a positive predictor of regional policy suitability. 
 
Third, our three attitudinal control variables, two for efficacy and one for political 
interest, matter in most cases but sometimes in surprising ways. Those with higher levels of 
political interest are more likely to support regional policy control and are less supportive of 
policy uniformity. Our two measures of political efficacy probe both so-called internal 
efficacy (‘people like me have no say’) and external efficacy (‘political actors don’t care’). 
The more dissatisfied one is with regional politics (the less efficacy one feels at the regional 
level) the less likely one is to feel that regional institutions are suitable to deal with policy 
problems. Only for policy uniformity – for which, it will be recalled, support tends to be 
particularly strong - is efficacy irrelevant.  
 
The three measures of current or desired regional influence perform fairly consistently 
across the dependent variables. A belief that the region should have the most influence and 
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support for independence are both positively associated with regional policy control and 
negatively associated with policy uniformity. Support for independence is the stronger 
predictor in each case. A sense that the region is more concerned with people’s needs and 
wishes is also a positive predictor of support for regional policy control and a negative 
predictor of support for policy uniformity. 
 
Fourth, and finally, the binary variable that identifies whether or not an individual 
lives in one of the four historic regions - Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Galicia - is also a 
significant predictor across the three dependent variables, and in the expected direction.  
 
As will now be obvious, in clear contrast to our findings at the aggregate level, the 
results of this multivariate analysis do not support the existence of a devolution paradox at the 
level of the individual. Rather, viewed through this optic, attitudes are far more consistent: 
preferences for regional decision-making and more regional government appear to be 
accompanied by a belief that regional institutions are suitable for dealing with policy issues 
problems, a greater openness for non-uniform policies as well as (but less consistently) lower 
support for inter-regional transfers.  
 
Types of Region 
This dissonance between the individual and aggregate levels – between the regression 
analysis and the descriptive statistics – appears puzzling and prompts further reflection.  One 
way of investigating it further is to continue with an individual level analysis, seeking to 
identify those respondents holding paradoxical views.  Given our concern about the 
relationship between individuals, regions and states, here we limit ourselves to locating the 
proportion of respondents holding ‘paradoxical’ views in our various regions.   
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We operationalize the concept of paradoxical individuals in three different ways.  First, what 
we call the Policy Paradox applies to individuals who believe the region should have most 
powers but do not support regional policy control in any of our policy fields. Second, the 
Uniformity Paradox focuses on abstract regional control and support for policy uniformity.  
Here individuals believe the region should have most influence but have above average 
support for policy uniformity.  On average, individuals support uniformity across four of our 
five fields so we have coded support for uniformity as uniformity across all 5 fields.  Finally 
our Total Paradox brings together abstract regional control, total uniformity and no regional 
policy control (ie. Region most influence = 1, uniformity for all fields = 1, regional policy = 
0). 
Table 9 about here 
These paradox measures underscore our earlier findings about the distinctiveness of ‘historic’ 
regions in devolving states.  There are many fewer ‘paradoxical’ individuals in four regions – 
Catalonia and Scotland, Wales and Galicia (arguably in two distinct sub-clusters).  
Preferences for policy uniformity appear somewhat more paradoxical in Wales and Galicia 
than Scotland and Catalonia, perhaps reflecting a fear that these relatively poor regions might 
lose out were policy allowed to diverge.  Austria stands out as particularly 'paradoxical'.  
Despite having radically different state structures (unitary versus federal) attitudes across 
French and German regions are strikingly similar.  In fact, for the policy and uniformity 
variaibles, Bavaria contains fewer paradoxical individuals than any of the French regions, and 
only marginally more such people than Ile de France with respect to the total paradox variable.  
Interestingly, while there are more paradoxical respondents in Castilla la Mancha than in any 
other of our UK or Spanish regions, there are fewer than in other states.  That having been 
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said, the profile of ‘statist’ Castilla la Mancha within a devolving Spain looks fairly similar to 
that of ‘regionalist’ Bavaria in Germany.   
 
This analysis helps us to specify the nature of the devolution paradox more precisely, with 
respect to its substance and the states and regions within which paradoxical individuals can be 
found.  So, the paradox appears to be strongest where we consider preferences for more 
regionalism and pan-state policy uniformity.  It is also strongest in federal states – and 
particularly in Austria – and then in unitary France.  An absolute majority of respondents in 
all Austria regions, as well as Lower Saxony and Thuringia and Alsace display paradoxical 
preferences on regionalism and policy uniformity. All the paradoxes are weakest in historic 
regions in devolving states. 
Table 10 about here 
Returning to regional level analysis, an obvious starting point, then, is the historic regions. 
The four ‘least paradoxical’ regions are all stateless nations with strong territorial identities, 
as confirmed in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents findings on a bipolar identity scale 
(commonly known as the Moreno question), which allows respondents both to claim 
exclusive regional or state-level identities, but also to claim dual identities which are either 
balanced or lean towards one or other of the identity poles. Table 10 is ordered by those 
regions with the ‘most regional’ identities (that is adding together the respondents who claim 
an exclusive or a predominantly regional identity). Scotland stands out as the ‘most regional’ 
of our regions, with Catalonia, Wales and Galicia also having significantly higher levels of 
regional than state identity.  
Table 11 about here 
Table 11 offers a measure of attachment to region relative to attachment to state, built on 
those respondents who claimed to be ‘very attached’ to either (or both) level(s). The four 
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historic regions appear among the group in which strong attachment to region outweighs 
strong attachment to the state, a group also extending to an interesting intermediate group of 
regions with distinctive cultures and/or histories: Brittany, Bavaria and Thuringia.vi We use an 
index of relative attachment (to state and region) in Figure 1 to explore the relationship at a 
regional level of analysis between attachment to the region and a similar index for the belief 
that regional institutions are suitable for dealing with policy problems. Figure 1 shows that 
stronger attachment to region is positively associated with belief in regional policy suitability, 
with a strong correlation coefficient of R=.71. But that statistical relationship masks two 
divergent stories. The four historic regions present a very clear relationship between the two 
variables. The other 10 regions flatline on the suitability index, while varying significantly on 
the attachment index.  
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Figure 2 reports a similar relationship across regions between relative attachment and 
a policy uniformity scale. Again there is a strong correlation coefficient (R=0.75), showing 
that as relative attachment to region increases support for uniformity decreases, but again the 
historic regions, especially Catalonia and Scotland, stretch out from a narrow cluster of the 
other regions at 0.8-0.9 on the uniformity index. For the other 10 regions relative attachment 
varies, but preferences for policy do not vary much with them.  
Figure 3 about here 
Figure 3 explores this distinction between what we have termed the historic regions 
and the rest in a different way, this time by correlating the strength of the view that the 
regional government ‘should have most influence’ with the regional policy suitability index. 
As reported earlier in Table 3 a majority in all 14 regions felt that the region should have most 
influence in the abstract. It would be logical to expect that the strength of support for regional 
influence would correlate positively with support for regional institutions as suitable for 
 20 
dealing with policy problems. Yet Figure 3 shows that the general trend across the regions is 
for a negative relationship. Believing that the region should have the most influence is 
negatively associated with support for regional control over various policy areas. But again 
there are two stories. The four historic regions display the ‘right’ or consistent relationship 
between the two variables with support for more influence positively associated with stronger 
support for regional suitability. Nine of the other 10 do not: the Austrian, French and German 
regions. These cluster around a belief that the region should have most influence which is as 
strong as in Catalonia and stronger than the other three historic regions. Yet that belief is not 
matched by support for regional policy suitability. It is in these regions that a devolution 
paradox stands revealed. 
 
In the final region, Castilla-La Mancha, the lowest preference for regional influence is 
matched by a low preference for regional policy suitability. Here again, then, is a more 
consistent set of preferences. Seen in this light, Castilla-La Mancha seems to occupy a 
position that is more consistent with our historic regions than the nine paradoxical regions, 
although in its particular case the relationship between the two variables demonstrates support 
for strong statism (or weak regionalism) rather than its opposite. If we interpret the data from  
Castilla-La Mancha in this manner, there is an emergent distinction not just between types of 
region but between types of state, with respondents in the UK and Spain seemingly sharing a 
similar logic of responses, and respondents in Austria, France and Germany a different, 
shared logic.  
 
Types of State: ‘either-or’ vs ‘both-and’ 
Table 12 about here 
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A tentative explanation of the distinction between what appear to be two types of state is 
suggested by Table 12. This presents a cross-tabulation of two sets of questions: which level 
of government should have most influence over how the region is run; and whether particular 
policy issues should be dealt with uniformly across the state, or should be a matter for the 
region to decide. The table reports on how strongly those who feel that the state government 
should have most influence over how the region is run prefer policy uniformity and how 
strongly those who feel that the regional government should have most influence over how 
the region is run think that policy issues should be a matter for the region to decide. We report 
the relationship to mean responses on the policy uniformity questions rather than presenting 
the actual cross-tabulations.  
 
The table suggests three things. First, that there is at best a modest, generally a 
negative, and rarely a significant relationship between the ‘should’ and the policy variables in 
all of the Austrian, French and German regions (with the single exception of Bavaria). If 
anything the belief that the state should have most influence produces less support for 
uniformity than the mean, and if anything the belief that the region should have most 
influence produces less support for regional decision-making. This is counterintuitive, but 
also chimes with the finding in Figure 3.  
 
Second, in the UK and Spanish regions (but also in Bavaria), there is in each case a 
positive (and in most cases a significant) relationship between preference for state influence 
and policy uniformity, and between preference for regional influence and regional decision. 
There is a polarisation of attitudes between a (smaller n) group of ‘pro-statists’ and a (larger n) 
group of ‘pro-regionalists’. Strikingly in all cases in these six regions, the pro-statists are 
more consistent in their pro-statism than the pro-regionalists are in their pro-regionalism.  
 22 
 
This polarisation of attitudes appears consistent with the continued conflict that exists 
around the appropriate form of territorial constitution for the UK and Spain (and the enduring 
concern by successive Bavarian governments to decentralise the German federal system). It 
suggests there are contested understandings of multi-level statehood that produce two groups 
of people – pro-devolution regionalists, and pro-centralisation statists – there is disagreement, 
but no contradiction evident in these attitudes towards devolution (or indeed a centralisation). 
Multi-level statehood in the UK and Spain (and Bavaria) appears in the eyes of citizens – at 
least in the cases we are able to report on – to present either-or choices: authority and 
competences should reside at either one level of government or the other, rather than be 
shared between them. 
 
This polarisation generally does not exist, or is very much more muted in Austria, 
France and Germany. There are – as Table 11 suggests – no entrenched camps of vociferous 
pro-statists and vociferous pro-regionalists. In all nine regions (including, but at a lower level, 
Bavaria) in these states there appears to be much less of a sense of having to choose between 
regional and state-level government. The absence of a perception of contest between the two 
levels of government is clearest in Austria. The Austrian regions provide the top three in the 
ranking on whether the region should have most influence (Table 3) and the top three in the 
ranking on preferences for policy uniformity (if we average out the responses in Table 6). 
Though on the surface these responses appear paradoxical, there is little sense of cross-
pressure or self-contradiction in them. The great majority of Austrian respondents are ‘both-
and’ respondents. Their statism appears more to be part of, rather than contradictory to, their 
regionalism.  
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This apparent absence of contradiction may seem counterintuitive for respondents 
from a federal state, who might be expected to be comfortable with regional-scale decision-
making and with it non-uniform policy outcomes. The Austrian version of federalism, 
however, is very different from the separated power models of federalism in the Anglophone 
tradition. The former is characterised by an interlocking structure of political authority in 
which the key locale of regional influence is in institutions of intergovernmental cooperation 
with central government rather than in the regional institutions themselves. In this ‘shared 
rule’ setting it may not be contradictory for Austrians to prefer strong regional influence and 
statewide policy uniformity; regional influence may be expressed in co-determining statewide 
policy outcomes. In this sense Austria is a ‘both-and’ multi-level state in which pro-
regionalist and pro-statist attitudes among citizens can co-exist without contradiction because 
regions and state co-exist without (very much) conflict in a cooperative and integrated multi-
level state structure. A similar case might be made for the German regions, which are also 
embedded in a system of (even more fully) interlocked, multi-level decision-making, with 
even the more autonomist Bavarians presenting responses closer to the other German regions 
than to historic regions in the UK and Spain. It is possible also that the French system of 
cumul des mandats, with key figures often holding office at local, regional and national level 
simultaneously, offers an informal, functional equivalent to the more formal interlocking of 
levels in Austria and Germany. 
 
Though some of the questions in the CANS survey allow us to probe ‘both-and’ 
responses for region and state, we did not set out to generate evidence of ‘shared rule’ 
attitudes which might without contradiction combine support for strong regional institutions 
and statewide policies. So the suggestion that the co-existence of pro-regionalism and pro-
statism particularly in the Austrian, but also the German and perhaps French regions reflects 
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the logic of shared-rule systems is therefore, at this stage, speculative. It does though allow us 
to move to some concluding reflections on the devolution paradox.  
 
Conclusion: Reflections on the Devolution Paradox 
Three key arguments emerge from the preceding discussion. The first is a challenge to the 
view that the logics of proximity/responsiveness and equity/solidarity in federal and devolved 
states necessarily stand in tension with one another, competing in a zero-sum game that ends 
up with one ‘dominating’ or ‘trumping’ the other (Banting 2006: 47, 64). Initially we 
identified a ‘devolution paradox’ with respondents apparently wishing more power to be 
vested at the regional level without embracing greater policy control or diversity across 
regions.  But the idea of a paradox can refer to an apparent contradiction that dissolves on 
closer or deeper analysis.  Our analysis – at both individual and regional levels – explained 
away a good deal of the apparent contradiction to which the devolution paradox seemed to 
point. Citizens may, quite logically, pursue collective goals through institutions at multiple 
levels and indeed see strong regional institutions as the guarantors of the common, statewide 
citizenship they prefer. In this sense – if this interpretation is correct – the CANS respondents 
in Austria, Germany and France are not contradictory beings, but sophisticated multi-level 
citizens. 
 
The second is that our respondents in the UK and Spain are not that paradoxical either. 
But here there is a competition or polarisation between those who prefer a state-wide scale for 
pursuing collective goals and those who prefer a regional scale. Even here, though, and even 
in the most regionalist regions of Catalonia and Scotland, most people have some attachment 
to, and see significant policy roles for, the state as a whole. Citizens here may be more 
divided, but they remain multi-levelled in their attitudes to politics and policy. Or at least they 
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do with the exception of statist Castilla-La Mancha. And it is here that we must enter an 
important caveat about our findings reflecting the limitations of our dataset.  
 
As was made clear in our introduction, the regions surveyed in CANS were selected in 
order to provide a good spread across our three independent variables of regional identity, 
regional institutional authority, and strength of regional economy. They were not intended to 
be representative of their state territories as a whole. So the question remains, to what extent 
are the statist attitudes apparent in Castilla-La Mancha representative of attitudes across the 
rest of what we might term Castilian Spain? While citizens in Galicia and Catalonia may be 
multi-levelled, to what extent is this true across the rest of the state? The same questions arise 
in even more pointed fashion in the context of the UK. No matter how limited the public 
appetite for regional authority there, Castilla-La Mancha is nonetheless a constituent part of 
Spain’s ‘state of autonomies’. By contrast, in the UK, England – representing some 85% of 
the population – remains highly centralised and governed by the apparatus of the UK central 
state which, for the purposes of many domestic policy areas, is now in effect the government 
of England (MITCHELL 2009). This curious hybrid system of territorial governance whereby 
a central state holds sway over a core area while at the same time relatively powerful regional 
bodies control most important areas of domestic policy in the periphery – a system recently 
dubbed ‘bi-constitutionalism’ (FLINDERS 2009) – reflects the very different attitudes 
towards territorial governance across the UK. Setting aside Northern Ireland as sui generis, 
overwhelming public support for significant self-government in Scotland and Wales coincides 
with a distinct lack of enthusiasm for even the most minimal form of regional government in 
England. This in turn suggests that while a sense of multi-levelled citizenship may well exist 
in the periphery, it is far from self-evident that this is also the case across the rest of the state. 
In short, the example of Castilla-La Mancha reminds us that not only are there divisions 
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between regionalists and statists within the four historic regions, but that there are almost 
certainly important divisions between the different parts of the two historic states of which 
they form a part; divisions that are not only impossible to capture through our dataset but also 
of great potential political salience. 
 
The clear differences between Austrian, French and German regions, on the one hand, 
and – caveats included – those in Spain and the UK, on the other, lead to a third and final 
point. Despite a research design that takes the regional scale as a unit of analysis, the fourteen 
regional cases cluster logically into groups defined by the states in which they are located. 
Taking serious, comparative account of multi-layered government within the state 
emphatically does not imply bypassing or otherwise somehow ignoring the state level. Quite 
the opposite: states and state form matter. They will also continue to matter. While data 
presented in this paper serve to confirm that regional secession is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility in at least some cases, the general picture presented is of diverse forms of multi-
levelled statehood; the compound adjective modifying, of course, but not effacing the noun. 
Which, in conclusion, is precisely why the type of research facilitated by the CANS project is 
so important. Inevitably, as a first attempt of its kind, it has its limitations. Fourteen regions at 
one point in time are not enough regions in enough states to draw definitive conclusions about 
the pattern and content, the puzzles or the paradoxes, of contemporary multi-level citizenship. 
Neither does it allow us to say anything about the direction and extent of change over time. 
Nonetheless, by demonstrating that it is possible to organise and co-ordinate such an 
ambitious programme of survey work, including within its reach so many regions in which 
similar scholarly activity has never taken place before, it has represented a vital first step. 
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Table One: Case Selection 
State/Region Regional Identity Regional Government Relative Wealth 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low Strong Medium Weak 
Austria          
Salzburg X    X   X  
Upper Austria  X   X    X 
Vienna   X  X  X   
France          
Alsace  X    X  X  
Brittany  X    X   X 
Ile de France   X   X X   
Germany          
Bavaria X   X   X   
Lower Saxony   X X    X  
Thuringia  X  X     X 
Spain          
Catalonia X   X   X   
Galicia  X  X     X 
Castilla-La Mancha   X X    X  
UK           
Scotland X   X    X  
Wales  X   X    X 
Note: For identity and wealth, the decision to place a region in the high, medium or low category was made on 
the basis of inter-regional comparisons within a state rather than across states. For regional government, the 
decision to place a region in the strong, medium or weak category is made on the basis of inter-regional 
comparisons across states, in large part to reflect the fact that regional institutional authority within a state tends 
to be constant. The original research design included three Swedish regions Jämtland, Malmö and Stockholm 
and South East England in the UK. Their absence, prompted by reductions in funding budgets, does not impact 
significantly on the identity and wealth variables, though would have added four more cases of ‘low’ regional 
government powers, leaving the three French regions as our only cases of regional decentralisation within 
unitary state structures. 
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Table Two: Relative Importance of Regional Decisions (Q7b, 7c) 
 a)  
regional 
decisions ‘very 
important’  
% 
b)  
state decisions  
‘very important’ 
% 
c)  
relative importance 
of regional 
decisions  
a) – b) 
Scotland 60 52 5 
Catalonia 43 42 1 
Galicia 41 42 -1 
Wales 47 50 -3 
Alsace 39 44 -5 
Brittany 37 42 -5 
Salzburg 35 41 -6 
Upper Austria 32 40 -8 
Thuringia 20 28 -8 
Castilla-La Mancha 33 43 -10 
Bavaria 27 38 -11 
Ile de France 40 52 -13 
Vienna 28 45 -17 
Lower Saxony 22 40 -18 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c. 
 29 
Table Three: Which Should, Which Does Have Most Influence (Q13, 14) 
 State Region 
 Does have 
most influence 
Should have 
most influence 
Does have most 
influence 
Should have 
most influence 
Scotland 49 23 38 73 
Wales 49 26 40 70 
Catalonia 31 13 58 79 
Castilla-La Mancha 27 35 58 55 
Galicia  25 21 54 65 
Ile de France 25 14 53 66 
Brittany 21 14 58 76 
Lower Saxony 17 16 60 73 
Alsace  16 11 61 75 
Thuringia 16 15 63 76 
Upper Austria 14 12 67 82 
Vienna 14 13 65 79 
Salzburg 13 8 73 89 
Bavaria 12 15 67 75 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707.  Rows sorted by ‘State has most 
influence’. 
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Table Four: Constitutional Options (Q25) 
 No regional 
government 
Fewer powers Status quo More powers Independence 
Catalonia 2 7 15 51 21 
Scotland 7 4 28 39 20 
Brittany 1 2 31 52 5 
Wales 9 6 28 42 14 
Galicia 5 8 26 51 3 
Alsace 1 2 42 41 6 
Salzburg 3 7 45 42 2 
Thuringia 9 13 28 39 5 
Bavaria 3 8 41 29 15 
Upper Austria 3 5 47 41 2 
Castilla-La Mancha 7 10 37 40 1 
Ile de France 3 3 35 38 0 
Lower Saxony 6 13 40 30 4 
Vienna 5 12 51 27 2 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by more powers + 
independence. 
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Table Five: Which is Most Suitable for Dealing with … (Q21a-e) 
 Environment Fighting crime Fighting unemployment Education Health 
 Region State EU Regio
n 
State EU Region State EU Region State EU Region State EU 
Scotland 39.2 33.8 26.9 48.3 47.8 3.9 38.6 57.2 4.2 66.6 30.6 2.8 57.4 39.6 2.9 
Wales 37.3 41.7 21.0 32.3 65.1 2.6 29.7 66.8 3.5 54.9 43.7 1.5 54.2 43.9 1.9 
Salzburg 30.0 30.0 40.0 21.3 57.1 21.6 21.5 58.6 19.9 18.2 73.9 7.9 24.5 68.1 7.3 
Upper Austria 31.4 33.6 35.1 20.3 55.2 24.5 24.5 59.6 15.9 22.7 67.6 9.7 26.4 65.3 8.3 
Vienna 23.1 37.6 39.3 34.4 46.0 19.6 20.7 62.8 16.5 19.6 69.3 11.1 23.8 68.4 7.8 
Lower Saxony 22.1 38.8 39.1 36.5 46.8 16.7 17.2 74.4 8.5 38.8 54.0 7.2 16.9 74.3 8.8 
Thuringia 27.1 34.2 38.7 30.9 50.5 18.6 17.8 74.3 8.0 28.6 64.8 6.6 15.4 77.5 7.2 
Bavaria 22.5 33.7 43.8 34.2 45.7 20.0 21.2 69.3 9.5 40.7 50.9 8.4 19.1 73.3 7.6 
Alsace 36.6 17.5 45.8 27.1 60.8 12.1 20.1 60.0 19.9 25.8 64.1 10.1 18.7 68.0 13.3 
Brittany 44.6 18.6 36.8 27.0 67.7 5.4 18.1 69.2 12.7 23.7 69.5 6.9 14.5 77.3 8.2 
Ile de France 34.9 24.0 41.1 26.9 65.7 7.3 14.7 67.7 17.7 17.8 74.8 7.4 11.8 79.1 9.1 
Catalonia 37.1 16.0 46.9 48.5 36.2 15.3 37.5 45.7 16.7 67.2 22.0 10.8 64.2 25.4 10.4 
Castilla-La Mancha 34.5 31.2 34.4 18.4 68.8 12.8 16.8 67.4 15.8 23.2 63.3 13.5 26.7 64.7 8.6 
Galicia 45.7 15.1 39.2 26.0 55.8 18.2 26.0 55.0 19.0 44.9 43.2 11.9 46.6 42.9 10.5 
Total 33.2 29.2 37.7 30.9 54.8 14.3 23.2 63.5 13.3 35.2 56.6 8.2 29.9 62.1 8.0 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. 
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Table Six: Uniform Policies, or Matters for the Region to Decide? (Q26a-d) 
 Tuition fees Young offenders Old Age Care Unemployment 
Benefits 
 Uniform 
% 
Region 
to 
decide 
% 
Uniform 
% 
Region to 
decide 
% 
Uniform 
% 
Region 
to 
decide 
% 
Uniform 
% 
Region 
to 
decide 
% 
Salzburg 92 8 87 13 82 7 93 17 
Upper Austria 91 8 86 13 81 8 91 17 
Vienna 93 6 88 11 85 7 93 15 
Alsace 83 9 82 12 76 9 85 14 
Brittany 83 10 83 13 81 14 80 13 
Ile de France 81 11 78 16 70 13 79 20 
Bavaria 75 22 84 14 74 15 83 23 
Lower Saxony 83 14 90 9 79 11 88 18 
Thuringia 84 12 92 6 89 7 91 8 
Castilla-La Mancha 77 18 79 18 81 9 88 16 
Catalonia 43 52 46 50 46 41 56 50 
Galicia 66 25 65 29 70 14 78 23 
Scotland 51 47 60 40 67 36 63 31 
Wales 63 36 80 20 74 28 71 24 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by uniform tuition fees. 
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Table Seven: Limits to Inter-Regional Solidarity (Q28) 
 Transfers from richer to 
poorer regions 
Regional economic 
situation compared to 
rest of state 
Regional GDP 
relative to state GDP 
 Agree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Better 
% 
Rank Proportion Rank 
Salzburg 49 47 49 5 1.12 5 
Upper Austria 52 46 62 2 0.97 6 
Bavaria 53 43 78 1 1.18 3= 
Vienna 65 32 58 3 1.33 2 
Catalonia 67 29 30 9 1.18 3= 
Lower Saxony 72 24 20 11 0.88 9= 
Alsace 69 23 55 4 0.93 8 
Thuringia 72 23 41* 8 0.71 14 
Scotland 79 20 29 7 0.96 7 
Wales 80 18 9 14 0.75 13 
Ile de France 78 13 43 6 1.55 1 
Brittany 83 11 26 10 0.88 9= 
Galicia 86 9 12 12 0.83 11 
Castilla-La Mancha 91 5 10 13 0.78 12 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % disagree with 
transfers to poorer regions. 
* By convention in German public attitudes work, Thuringian respondents were asked to compare their situation 
with the other east German regions, not with the rest of Germany as a whole. The Thuringian figure of 41% is 
therefore an outlier. If comparing with the rest of Germany as a whole we might expect a figure closer to the 
bottom group of Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha and Wales. 
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Table Eight: Multivariate Analysis of Dependent Variables 
 
 Regional policy 
control 
Policy uniformity Inter-regional 
solidarity 
Age 
Gender 
Ethnic min 
Religiosity 
Married 
Born in region 
 
Attachment to region 
Importance of reg decisions 
Perceived regional wealth 
Political interest 
Don’t care 
No say 
Region should influence 
Region more concerned 
Independence 
Historic nation 
.484 (.093) *** 
-.002 (.055) 
.164 (.148) 
-.062 (.102 
-.055 (.057) 
.015 (.062) 
 
.527 (.095) *** 
.562 (.110) *** 
.237 (.077) *** 
.269 (.095) *** 
-.152 (.095) 
-.182 (.094) * 
.544 (.071) *** 
.585 (.102) *** 
1.042 (.094)*** 
1.022 (.061) *** 
.048 (.101) 
-.034 (.060) 
-.313 (.159) ** 
.166 (.111) 
.035 (.063) 
-.007 (.069) 
 
-.650 (.104) *** 
-.347 (.119) *** 
-.183 (.085) ** 
-.242 (.103) ** 
-.121 (.106) 
-.007 (.105) 
-.281 (.080) *** 
-.457 (.115) *** 
-1.193 (.101) *** 
-1.162 (.068) *** 
.438 (.094) *** 
.030 (.055) 
.143 (.152 
.201 (.104) * 
-.030 (.055) 
-.031 (.063) 
 
-.532 (.096) *** 
.107 (.110) 
-.267 (.078) *** 
.166 (.096) * 
-.050 (.097) 
.235 (.095) ** 
-.058 (.071) 
-.042 (.099) 
.156 (.095) 
-.429 (.061) *** 
Thresholds 
Policy control = 0 
Policy control = .2 
Policy control = .4 
Policy control = .6 
Policy control = .8 
 
Uniformity scale = 0 
Uniformity scale = .25 
Uniformity scale = .50 
Uniformity scale = .75 
 
Inter-regional solidarity = 0 
Inter-regional solidarity = .33 
Inter-regional solidarity = .67 
 
1.242 (.170) *** 
2.198 (.172) *** 
3.051 (.175) *** 
3.913 (.178) *** 
4.737 (.183) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.303 (.199) *** 
-3.574 (.196) *** 
-2.907 (.194) *** 
-2.170 (.191) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.014 (.178) *** 
-1.594 (.170) *** 
.229 (.168)  
Nagelkerke R2 .222 .202 .038 
Results are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic 
regression. ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.1  Categorical variables (gender, ethnicity, marital 
status, place of birth, region should influence, region more concerned, historic nation) have 
been entered as factors rather than covariates so that coefficients give scores for trait present 
(1) rather than trait absent (0).  The signs of coefficients are merely reversed if they are 
entered as covariates.  Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707 
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Table Nine: Regional scores by paradox 
% in each category 
 Policy Paradox 
 
Uniformity 
Paradox 
Total Paradox 
Salzburg 36 64 29 
Vienna 32 62 26 
Upper Austria 32 58 25 
Thuringia 27 54 21 
Alsace 28 51 19 
Lower Saxony 22 51 16 
Brittany 23 49 15 
Ile de France 27 40 14 
Bavaria 20 40 14 
Castilla La Mancha 18 34 13 
Galicia 11 31 8 
Wales  11 29 6 
Scotland 8 22 5 
Catalonia 8 18 5 
Average 22 43 16 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % Total Paradox. 
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Table Ten: Bipolar Identity Scale (Q5) 
 Just 
Regional 
Identity 
Regional 
more than 
State 
Identity 
Equally 
Regional and 
State Identity 
State more 
than 
Regional 
Identity 
Just State 
Identity 
Scotland 19 41 26 4 7 
Catalonia 16 29 37 6 6 
Wales 11 29 33 10 15 
Galicia 6 25 57 6 4 
Bavaria 9 19 36 11 19 
Thuringia 9 18 44 9 17 
Upper Austria 10 16 38 11 22 
Salzburg 9 17 50 9 10 
Brittany 2 23 50 15 9 
Vienna 7 14 38 15 19 
Alsace 1 17 42 20 15 
Lower Saxony 6 11 34 15 27 
Ile de France 1 7 30 42 12 
Castilla-La Mancha 2 4 52 18 20 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % regional identity + 
regional more than state identity. 
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Table Eleven: Relative Attachment to Region (Q1c, d) 
 a)  
‘very attached’ to 
region 
% 
b)  
‘very attached’ to 
state 
% 
c)  
relative attachment 
to region  
a) – b) 
Scotland 80 43 37 
Catalonia 55 25 30 
Wales 69 49 20 
Brittany 65 49 16 
Thuringia 57 42 15 
Galicia 58 44 14 
Bavaria 53 42 9 
Alsace 60 60 0 
Vienna 52 61 -9 
Upper Austria 51 62 -11 
Salzburg 52 64 -12 
Lower Saxony 36 51 -15 
Castilla-La Mancha 33 52 -19 
Ile de France 26 53 -27 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c. 
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Figure One: Regional Attachment and Regional Policy Suitability 
 
 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707 
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Figure Two: Regional Attachment and Policy Uniformity 
 
 
 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707 
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Figure Three: Regional Influence and Regional Policy Suitability 
 
 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707 
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Table Twelve: Which Level Should Have Most Influence, and How Uniform Should Policy Be? 
 
 Scotland Wales Salzburg Upper Austria Vienna Lower Saxony Thuringia 
 State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
Unemployment 
benefit 
+20.6* +6.7* +17.1* +6.8* -1.3 -0.5 -5.3 -0.7 +0.3 -0.1 -2.5 -1.3 -1.3 -0.3 
Tuition fees +18.1* +6.6* +20.2* +8.2* -3.9 -0.5 -2.3 -0.6 -0.2 +0.2 -1.3 -0.6 +1.0 -0.2 
Old age care +15.6* +6.4* +16.2* +6.5* -4.3 -0.4 +1.4 +0.3 +0.6 +0.1 -3.4 -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 
Juvenile crime +19.0* +6.7* +12.2* +5.1* -2.2* -0.4* -2.4 -0.3 -3.4* -1.0* -5.0* -1.5* +3.8 +0.6 
n (state/region 
should) 
205 664 230 621 76 799 107 745 119 630 140 683 135 704 
  
 Bavaria Alsace Brittany Ile de France Catalonia  Castilla-La 
Mancha 
Galicia 
 State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
State 
should: 
policy 
uniform 
Region 
should: 
region 
decides 
Unemployment 
benefit 
+10.1* +1.8* -0.5 +0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -5.8 -0.5 +25.3* +5.1* +1.9 +1.1 +7.1* +2.3* 
Tuition fees +10.5* +2.5* +0.9* -0.1* +0.7 +0.3 -1.8 +0.4 +25.7* +6.1* +3.5 +2.6 +7.8* +4.3* 
Old age care +9.0* +1.4* -1.2 -0.5 -3.5 -0.4 -3.2 +0.5 +22.4* +7.3* +3.7* +2.9* +3.6* +3.5* 
Juvenile crime +4.2* +1.9 -5.1 -0.3 -1.3 -0.2 -5.0 -0.5 +26.8* +6.6* +2.4 +1.5 +7.2 +2.9* 
n (state/region 
should) 
133 681 86 619 118 641 110 586 117 687 305 486 177 564 
Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707, * Pearson Chi-Square <0.05 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
i While we recognise the sensitivities attached to the word ‘region’ in places like Scotland that 
are widely considered to be ‘nations’, we have nonetheless retained the usual academic 
convention of using ‘regional’ to describe tiers of government smaller in scale than the state 
and bigger than local government. All alternatives appear to raise equally intractable – if 
different – problems. 
ii It might be noted that while the relationship between the regional and state-wide scales was 
the primary focus of the project, the questionnaire also probed attitudes to the broader 
European and narrower local scales where appropriate. 
iii  ‘Nation-state’ is another problematic term, not least given the limited extent to which 
national communities and state boundaries coincide in Europe and elsewhere. We prefer to 
use ‘state’ and ‘state-wide’ as a more neutral terminology determined by the administrative 
boundaries that demarcate states. 
iv The absence of systematically comparative regional level public attitudes research is one 
aspect of the ‘methodological nationalism’ we critique here.  The difficulty of finding 
research funding to carry out a study of the kind reported here meant that we were unable to 
include an English region or any regions from Sweden or Italy.  We have subsequently fielded 
a CANS-type survey in England, finding considerable support for a sub-state level of 
government there.  We hope to carry out further rounds of research and to include more 
regions and states within the CANS framework.   
v There is also a striking outlier: Ile de France. Ile de France is the richest region relative to 
others in its state (though less so in the perception of its inhabitants), but is among the most 
supportive of inter-regional transfers. This may reflect its status as a capital city region 
dominated by the Paris conurbation; (greater) Parisians may have strongly ‘statist’ attitudes 
that reflect their location at the centre of the French state and outweigh the more instrumental 
  5 
                                                                                                                                                        
calculations of material interest that appear to be present in other rich regions. Other work 
deriving from the CANS project is focusing on what appear to be the shared and distinctive 
characteristics of the two capital city regions in the data set, namely the Ile de France and 
Vienna. 
vi Brittany is a particularly interesting case, not least because of the presence of Wales among 
the historic regions group (the Welsh and Breton languages are closely related.) We hope to 
return to this intermediate group in future analysis. 
